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COMMERCE, DEATH PANELS, AND BROCCOLI: 
OR WHY THE ACTIVITY/INACTIVITY 
DISTINCTION IN THE HEALTH CARE CASE WAS 
REALLY ABOUT THE RIGHT TO BODILY 
INTEGRITY 
Michael C. Dorf* 
ABSTRACT 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, five 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court opined that the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate 
“inactivity.” In giving effect to the intuition that laws compelling 
activity impose a more serious burden on the individual than do laws 
forbidding activity, these Justices mistakenly imported a libertarian 
principle into the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
intuition is not even true in all individual rights cases. Nonetheless, in 
the aim of understanding the logic behind the position, this Article 
explains how affirmative mandates that infringe the substantive due 
process right to bodily integrity can be more intrusive than 
prohibitions. In so doing, it draws connections between the political 
charge that the health care law would establish “death panels” and 
the effective use of the hypothetical fear that upholding the law’s so-
called individual mandate would permit the government to require 
people to eat broccoli. 
INTRODUCTION 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 five 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court accepted the proposition 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. I am grateful to Byron 
Crowe for outstanding research assistance. The author delivered an oral version of this article as the 
Spring 2013 Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture at Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the power 
to enact the so-called “individual mandate” of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA).2 Why not? Because, they said, the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate 
“inactivity.”3 The Court4 thus endorsed a distinction—between 
regulable “activity” and non-regulable “inactivity”—that had not 
previously played an important, or arguably any, role in its 
Commerce Clause doctrine. 
Part I of this Article explains why the activity/inactivity distinction 
is a mostly harmless but nonetheless unnecessary addition to 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.5 It is mostly harmless because 
Congress rarely needs to adopt mandates and, even after the ruling in 
the ACA case, can enact de facto mandates via the taxing power. The 
distinction is unnecessary because the fears of the five conservative 
Justices who endorsed the activity/inactivity distinction were 
unfounded. They worried that if Congress could mandate 
participation in commerce then its powers under the Commerce 
Clause would be limitless. But, as I shall explain, it is fairly simple to 
identify laws that Congress would be powerless to pass, even if the 
ACA had been upheld under the Commerce Clause. The Court could 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 3. See id. at 2586–87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 4. I refer to the five votes on the Commerce Clause issue as a decision of “the Court” even though 
one can make a respectable argument that it constitutes dicta. After all, Chief Justice Roberts sustained 
the mandate under the taxing power, and so one might think that nothing he said about the Commerce 
Clause was necessary to the ruling. See id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Yet Chief Justice Roberts himself disagreed. He stated that 
his conclusion that the mandate was outside the scope of the Commerce Clause was a necessary step en 
route to his decision to invoke the principle of constitutional avoidance in applying the Taxing Clause. 
See id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). In any event, it makes little long-term difference whether 
the Court’s pronouncements on the Commerce Clause in the ACA case were holding or dicta. Lower 
courts will follow the principle either way, see, e.g., Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 
402 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that “repeated dicta from the [Supreme] Court . . . guides our exercise 
of . . . legal judgment in this case”); Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 
1989) (noting that “[t]his [c]ourt should respect considered Supreme Court dicta”); cf. Michael C. Dorf, 
Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2026 (1994) (explaining why many lower courts follow 
well-considered dicta of the Supreme Court), and the ruling itself makes clear that at least as presently 
constituted, a majority of the Supreme Court will apply the no-regulation-of-inactivity-under-the-
Commerce-Clause rule in future cases. 
 5. See infra Part I. 
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have preserved the notion that the powers of Congress are limited 
with a rule that allows many but not all mandates, and the shape of 
that rule could have been readily adapted from the Court’s own 
recent Commerce Clause precedents. 
Why, then, did the conservative majority—the four dissenters plus 
the Chief Justice—vote to forbid mandates under the Commerce 
Clause? The answer to that question can be found in a phrase first 
uttered by Justice Kennedy during the oral argument and later 
repeated by Chief Justice Roberts in the portion of his opinion that 
rejected the Commerce Clause as authority for the ACA mandate. 
Justice Kennedy asked Solicitor General Verrilli whether the 
government ought “not have a heavy burden of justification” when a 
law “chang[es] the relation of the individual to the government.”6 
Echoing the sentiment, the Chief Justice wrote in his opinion that 
permitting “Congress the same license to regulate what we do not 
do” as it enjoys with respect to what we affirmatively do, would 
“fundamentally chang[e] the relation between the citizen and the 
Federal Government.”7 
Note the difference in wording between Justice Kennedy’s 
question and Chief Justice Roberts’s statement. Whereas the Chief 
Justice was careful to limit his point to the relation between the 
citizen and the federal government, Justice Kennedy had referred to a 
change in the relation between the individual and “the government” 
in a generic sense. I believe that Justice Kennedy’s seemingly less 
precise usage more accurately captured the core intuition driving the 
votes of all five conservative Justices who sought to limit 
government’s ability to regulate inactivity. The intuition is that 
government—at any level—may properly tell people what they 
cannot do, but not what they must do. 
Put less sympathetically, in the ACA case the activity/inactivity 
distinction was a libertarian principle masquerading as a principle of 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
11-398-Tuesday.pdf. 
 7. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2589. 
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federalism. Or, as an amicus brief on behalf of a group of law 
professors (including myself) put it: 
While offered as a challenge to Congress’s commerce power, 
[the ACA challengers’] claim is really about individual liberty, 
reflecting an instinct about how far any government, state or 
federal, may go in ordering the affairs of its people. Plaintiffs 
effectively ask this Court to import a substantive due process 
limitation into the Commerce Clause.8 
I continue to think that the five conservative Justices were wrong to 
import a substantive due process limitation into the Commerce 
Clause, but after explaining why, I shall take up the further question 
of whether substantive due process itself ought to be understood as 
barring affirmative mandates, either conclusively or presumptively.9 
Part II of this Article addresses that question.10 I begin by rejecting 
the notion that there is any general prohibition or even presumption 
against affirmative government mandates. Nonetheless, the doctrine 
that has developed around a particular set of substantive due process 
rights—those that may be understood as implementing the right to 
bodily integrity—does indeed reflect an intuition that affirmative 
mandates are more intrusive than negative prohibitions. I explain 
why this intuition might be regarded as sensible. I also explain how 
the same intuition connects the political hysteria around the ACA 
with the legal case that was marshaled against it. Seeing the matter 
through the lens of bodily integrity connects the false but politically 
effective charge that the ACA would establish “death panels”11 with 
the ACA’s constitutional challengers’ effective use of the fear that 
upholding the mandate would permit the government to require 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Brief of Law Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners and Reversal on the Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue at 4–5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160237, at *4–5. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See Glenn Kessler, Sarah Palin, ‘Death Panels’ and ‘Obamacare,’ WASH. POST FACT CHECKER 
BLOG (June 27, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/sarah-palin-
death-panels-and-obamacare/2012/06/27/gJQAysUP7V_blog.html. 
4
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people to eat broccoli. Both death panels and forced consumption of 
broccoli raise the specter of a government that directs people’s 
intimate decisions about the use of their bodies. That is a legitimate 
concern even if it was misplaced in the ACA case and even though it 
contradicts decades of attacks on modern substantive due process 
doctrine by conservative Justices. 
I. COMMERCE 
Despite the sturm und drang that accompanied the ACA litigation, 
the case may not be especially important as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine because neither the Commerce Clause ruling nor the taxing 
power ruling imposes a serious limitation on the actual authority of 
Congress. To be sure, writing in the New York Times just days after 
the ACA ruling, Professor Pamela Karlan characterized the 
conservative majority—the four dissenters plus the Chief Justice—as 
having “laid down a cache of weapons that future courts can use to 
attack many of the legislative achievements of the New Deal and the 
Great Society . . . .”12 I agree with Professor Karlan that the portion 
of the Court’s ruling invalidating the expansion of Medicaid as going 
beyond the scope of the Spending Clause could indeed threaten 
important federal legislation. Still, it is worth noting that Justices 
Breyer and Kagan joined the conservatives to forge a 7-2 majority on 
that point,13 and so it remains possible that the ACA’s Spending 
Clause holding will come to mark only an extreme outer limit—the 
existence of which the Court’s leading precedents had long 
signaled.14 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Pamela S. Karlan, Opinion, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/opinion/sunday/no-respite-for-liberals.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
 13. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2576. Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in Part IV of the 
Chief Justice’s opinion striking down the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as exceeding Congress’s power 
under the Spending Clause. Id.; id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(“Seven Members of the Court agree that the Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is 
unconstitutional.”). 
 14. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recognized that in 
some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
5
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Putting aside the Spending Clause, I am not nearly as pessimistic 
as Karlan about the likely impact of the Court’s rulings on the taxing 
and commerce powers. Karlan frets that given the unpopularity of tax 
increases, a Congress that can only regulate through the taxing power 
“is a Congress with little power at all.”15 Perhaps, but one should 
recall that on this point the Chief Justice joined his four more liberal 
colleagues in laying down the rule that Congress may use the taxing 
power even when it does not invoke the taxing power.16 And even the 
four conservative dissenters were prepared to sustain the individual 
mandate if it had been clearly labeled and more clearly structured as 
a tax.17 Karlan’s worry, then, comes down to a prediction that 
Congress will lack the ingenuity to structure future mandates so that 
they are sufficiently tax-like to satisfy five Justices but not so tax-like 
as to offend the American people’s anti-tax sensibility. That is 
ultimately a view about politics about which neither Professor Karlan 
nor I have any special expertise. 
In any event, suppose that the ACA ruling really does foreclose 
future mandates because the Court has now ruled that Congress lacks 
the power to impose them directly and political forces prevent their 
imposition through the tax code. So what? For more than twenty-
three decades after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress 
enacted no laws that clearly violated the no-mandate rule announced 
in the ACA case.18 It is therefore difficult to believe that the no-
mandate rule will seriously hamstring future Congresses in achieving 
                                                                                                                 
590 (1937))). 
 15. Karlan, supra note 12. 
 16. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 17. See id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting Congress could 
constitutionally achieve the ACA’s goals by structuring the tax as a tax credit for those “who do 
purchase [health] insurance”); see also Neil H. Buchanan, It Does Not Matter Whether Congress Calls a 
Tax a Tax: Explaining the Dissenting Justices’ Misconceptions About the Taxing Power in the 
Affordable Care Act Case, VERDICT (July 5, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/07/05/it-does-not-
matter-whether-congress-calls-a-tax-a-tax (describing how the dissenters implicitly “embrace the idea 
that Congress can [impose the mandate] in two functionally equivalent ways, but the law at issue will be 
outside of Congress’s power unless it uses the magic words necessary to bring it under the dissenters’ 
preferred vocabulary.”). 
 18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting the “novelty” of 
the individual mandate when “Congress has never attempted to rely on [the commerce] power to compel 
individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product”). 
6
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important national objectives of the sort it has previously achieved 
using the Commerce Clause. The ACA case was never very 
important for constitutional law; it was important because of its 
immediate political and policy ramifications, involving, as it did, a 
signature legislative accomplishment of a first-term President during 
a contested re-election campaign19 with respect to a longstanding 
policy objective of progressive politicians.20 
I should be clear that in saying that the Commerce Clause holding 
of the ACA case was constitutionally unimportant, I do not mean that 
it was correct. I have long maintained that there is no good reason 
why the Commerce Clause ought to permit Congress only to regulate 
activity rather than inactivity that has substantial economic effects.21 
Certainly, the reasons offered by the Chief Justice and the four 
dissenters do not stand up to careful examination. 
The Chief Justice pointed to the repeated use of the term “activity” 
in the prior case law,22 but that only shows that the prior cases 
involved activity—which everyone acknowledged.23 None of the 
prior cases had accepted or rejected direct regulation of inactivity 
because no case presented the question. 
The Chief Justice also argued that the very words “regulate” and 
“commerce” connote regulation of pre-existing activity, rather than 
legal mandates to engage in activity.24 But that is hardly self-evident. 
Consider the provisions of federal labor law and federal antitrust law 
that have been construed to forbid secondary boycotts.25 A boycott is 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Michael C. Dorf, How Much is Truly at Stake in the Legal Battle Over Obamacare?, 
VERDICT (Sept. 26, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/26/how-much-is-truly-at-stake-in-the-legal-
battle-over-obamacare. 
 20. See Ronald Dworkin, Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real Argument, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(May 10, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandate-constitutional-
real-argument/?pagination=false. 
 21. See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance Reform, Part II: Congressional 
Power, FINDLAW (Nov. 2, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091102.html. 
 22. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (“Our precedent . . . uniformly describe the 
[commerce] power as reaching ‘activity.’”). 
 23. See generally, id. 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 24. See id. at 2586–89 (“The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial 
activity to be regulated.”). 
 25. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A), (e) (designating 
secondary boycotts as unfair labor practices); NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 473 
U.S. 61, 78–79 (1985) (holding secondary boycotts prohibited under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the 
7
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economic inactivity—a refusal to engage in business with the 
target—in more or less the same way that the non-purchase of health 
insurance is economic inactivity. Yet prior to the ACA litigation it 
would not have occurred to anyone to challenge the relevant laws as 
beyond the scope of the Commerce Power. And prior cases, 
especially Wickard v. Filburn,26 accepted that Congress could 
penalize one activity—there, the growing of wheat in excess of a 
government quota—in order to encourage another activity—the 
purchase of wheat in the market.27 Given the traditional view that 
Congress is the master of the means for achieving legitimate ends,28 
it seems an empty formalism to say that Congress may not do directly 
what it may do indirectly. 
The conservative Justices’ main argument was that if the ACA 
were upheld, then the power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause would be unlimited, in violation of the structure of Article I, 
Section 8, and the Tenth Amendment.29 But this claim is false in light 
of the Court’s own relatively recent precedents. Even if the ACA had 
been upheld under the Commerce Clause, Congress would not be 
omnipotent. For example, Congress would still lack the power to ban 
the possession of firearms in school zones (per United States v. 
Lopez30) or to provide a civil remedy in federal court for gender-
motivated violence (per United States v. Morrison).31 Why? Because, 
                                                                                                                 
National Labor Relations Act); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 
U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (holding secondary boycotts per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 27. Id. at 128 (holding that Congress’s “power to regulate commerce includes the power to 
regulate . . . prices . . . and practices affecting such prices” and thus Congress was acting within its 
authority when attempting to “increase the market price of wheat and to that end to limit the volume 
thereof . . .”). 
 28. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”). 
 29. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (“What is absolutely clear, affirmed by the text of the 1789 
Constitution, by the Tenth Amendment . . . and by innumerable cases of ours in the 220 years since, is 
that there are structural limits upon federal power—upon what it can prescribe with respect to private 
conduct, and upon what it can impose upon the sovereign States.”). 
 30. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
 31. 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000). 
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in the Court’s argot, firearms possession and gender-motivated 
violence are not “economic activit[ies].”32 
That limit also suggests a straightforward limit on affirmative 
mandates: if some activity is not “economic,” then Congress may 
neither make that activity the predicate for regulation—as in Lopez 
and Morrison—nor may Congress compel otherwise-inactive people 
to engage in it—as per the rule that the Chief Justice and the four 
conservative dissenters could have laid down in the ACA case. To 
give two obvious examples, even if the ACA had been upheld under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress still would be powerless to mandate 
gun possession near schoolyards or the commission of gender-
motivated violence. 
Now, it will be immediately objected that these are meaningless 
limits. After all, Congress would never try to mandate gender-
motivated violence and any law doing so would violate the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.33 That may be a fair objection with respect to the Morrison-
based hypothetical example but the Lopez-based hypothetical 
example is harder to dismiss. A number of local governments around 
the country have enacted laws mandating gun ownership or 
possession in particular locales, such as the home.34 Given the 
strength of the gun-rights lobby,35 it is at least possible to imagine 
Congress enacting a similar law for the nation as a whole. Doing so 
might infringe the Second Amendment, but then again it might not. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity.”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an 
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect . . . interstate 
commerce.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638–39 (1975) (invalidating a gender-based 
distinction in the Social Security Act as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 34. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2012). 
 35. See, e.g., Laura I. Langbein & Mark A. Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: 
Gun Control in the U. S. House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413, 433 (1990) (concluding, after an 
empirical analysis, that the NRA and Handgun Control, Inc. (a pro-gun control group) were effective at 
influencing legislative decision-making); Peter H. Stone, History Repeat? NRA Has Blocked New Gun 
Laws After Tragedies Like Tucson, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:44 PM, updated Apr. 
19, 2011, 3:44 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/01/11/2211/history-repeat (noting the 
“legendary” influence of the NRA in Washington, stemming from “the grassroots clout of its 4 million 
members and the tens of millions it has spent over the last two decades on campaign contributions and 
lobbying”). 
9
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Professor Joseph Blocher has argued that the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms as construed in District of Columbia v. 
Heller36 and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois37 is best read to 
entail a right not to keep and bear arms, but as Professor Blocher 
himself acknowledges, the question is difficult and open.38 Let us 
suppose that the Second Amendment would not be offended by a 
federal law requiring that competent law-abiding adult citizens (duly 
defined in the law) keep working firearms in their homes. Would 
such a law nonetheless be unconstitutional as beyond the power of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause? 
Before I answer that question, I need to set aside a complicating 
wrinkle. Might a federal law obligating law-abiding adult citizens to 
keep firearms in the home be sustained under the power of Congress 
“[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia”?39 
As Justice Ginsburg noted in the ACA case, as early as 1792 
Congress enacted legislation mandating citizens “to purchase 
firearms and gear in anticipation of service in the Militia.”40 But my 
hypothetical federal mandate would apply to those too old or too 
feeble to serve in the militia, and so, at least as applied to them, it 
might be said to be beyond the scope of the Militia Clause. Even if 
not, we can ask whether the hypothetical gun mandate would also fall 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause, on the assumption that 
Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, may mandate 
economic activity but not non-economic activity. 
Given Lopez, the answer is pretty clearly no. If gun possession in a 
school zone is not economic activity, then neither is gun possession 
in the home. To be sure, under the Lopez-based test I am proposing, 
the government could use the Commerce power to mandate the 
purchase of guns, but it can already effectively accomplish that result 
                                                                                                                 
 36. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 37. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 38. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 5–7 (admitting that “there are serious objections to” the thesis that 
the Second Amendment entails a right not to keep and bear arms). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 40. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627 n.10 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing the Uniform Militia 
Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 271). 
10
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under the taxing power: by withholding tax deductions or tax credits 
from those who do not purchase guns. For truly economic activity, 
only formalism could warrant distinguishing the taxing power from 
the Commerce power. 
What other activities would Congress be powerless to mandate 
under the rule that I am suggesting was implicit in the Court’s prior 
Commerce Clause cases? The answer should be found in those cases. 
In Gonzales v. Raich,41 the Court invoked a dictionary to define 
“economic” activity as “the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities,”42 but this definition appears to be 
under-inclusive because it omits services. Presumably that oversight 
simply reflects the fact that Raich involved a commodity—
marijuana—rather than a service.43 In a subsequent case involving 
services, we can expect the Court to hold that they too count as 
economic activity, at least when traded for money or other value. 
The more troubling aspect of Raich is its inclusion of 
“consumption of commodities” within the definition of economic 
activities.44 Suppose I eat a raspberry that I pick from a bush that 
grows wild on my property. Have I really engaged in economic 
activity that may serve as the predicate for federal regulation under 
the Commerce Clause? It is easy to see why the Raich Court wanted 
to include consumption in its definition: by defining the relevant 
activity in Raich as the consumption of marijuana, the Court was able 
to analogize the case closely to Filburn, where the law aimed to limit 
the consumption of home-grown wheat by people like Filburn.45 
                                                                                                                 
 41. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 42. Id. at 25 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)). 
 43. See id. at 18. 
 44. See id. at 25–26. 
 45. At least that is how the facts have been understood by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing farmer Filburn as “growing 
wheat for consumption on his own farm”); Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 (“Like the farmer in Wickard, 
respondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an 
established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”). In fact, Filburn’s “homegrown” wheat was almost 
certainly part of a larger economic enterprise. To eat the wheat that Filburn grew beyond his quota “the 
Filburn family would have had to consume nearly forty-four one-pound loaves of bread each day for a 
year.” Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and Commerce, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 102 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). “In Filburn’s time, farmers 
fed twenty times more wheat to livestock than they ground into flour for home use.” Id. 
11
Dorf: Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the Activity/Inactiv
Published by Reading Room, 2013
908 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:4 
 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of consumption of commodities in the 
definition of economic activity is difficult to reconcile with the 
exclusion of possession of a commodity (a gun) in Lopez. Suppose 
that instead of just possessing his gun, Lopez had been eating it—
either in the literal sense or as a euphemism for using it to commit 
suicide. In what sense would that be an “economic” activity of any 
sort? 
If consumption of a commodity may serve as the predicate for 
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, that should be 
because there is a national market for the commodity and demand to 
consume it drives that market, not because the consumption itself is 
economic activity. The very Controlled Substances Act at issue in 
Raich appeared to reflect Congressional recognition of that fact. The 
Act does not outlaw “consumption” of controlled substances but their 
manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with intent to 
distribute or dispense.46 
Accordingly, in the ACA case the Court could have said that while 
the purchase of a commodity like broccoli is of course economic 
activity that Congress may either forbid or require, its consumption is 
not. Such a ruling would have allowed the Court to uphold the 
mandate to purchase health insurance under the Commerce Clause 
without opening the floodgates for consumption mandates. 
So why did the conservative majority reject this path? Setting 
aside legal realist and political explanations, part of the answer may 
be that five Justices took the language of Raich too seriously. 
Thinking that purchasing and consumption were constitutionally 
indistinguishable under the Commerce Clause, they saw no way to 
sustain the health insurance purchase mandate without also implying 
the validity of consumption mandates. Admittedly, this explanation 
only partly explains the conservatives’ view in the ACA case because 
they also appear to have been concerned about purchase mandates in 
their own right. However, given the functional equivalence of tax 
incentives and purchase mandates, that concern was a mostly empty 
formalism. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). 
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Accordingly, the only real functional concern at play in the five 
conservatives’ opinions was—or should have been—a concern about 
consumption mandates. But that still leaves us with a puzzle. If (four 
of the five of) the Court’s conservatives already thought that 
Congress has the power to forbid consumption of commodities,47 
why were they troubled by the notion that Congress might compel 
such consumption? Why, in other words, is it worse to be forced to 
eat broccoli than to be forbidden from eating broccoli? The answer—
if there is one—is more likely to be found in libertarian principles 
than in federalism principles. 
II. MANDATES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 
Are there grounds for thinking that legal mandates impose greater 
infringements on liberty than do prohibitions? If we ask the question 
categorically, the answer must be no. It is easy to imagine affirmative 
mandates that impose no burden at all because they merely require 
people to do what they would choose to do anyway—a mandate that 
people must breathe air, for example—or impose only a trivial 
burden—such as an obligation to pay a one-penny head tax. At the 
same time, prohibitions can be extraordinarily burdensome—as with 
laws forbidding religious rituals, intimate relationships or the use of 
what could be life-saving medicine. Only the imagination limits the 
range of pairwise comparisons in which most rational people would 
clearly prefer to be subject to the mandate rather than the prohibition. 
Nonetheless, other things being equal, we can expect mandates to 
be more intrusive than prohibitions. Let us compare a mandate to φ48 
and a mirroring prohibition on φ-ing. Again, we can imagine many 
circumstances in which the prohibition is worse. If φ-ing is breathing, 
then anyone who is not suicidal will prefer the mandate to the 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Justice Thomas is an exception. He would roll back much of modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Power starting in the 1930s was a “wrong turn” and 
a “dramatic departure . . . from a century and a half of precedent”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (raising the same concern). 
 48. I follow the custom in the philosophical literature of using the Greek letter φ, pronounced “phi,” 
as the variable that denotes some activity. 
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prohibition. But in the more likely scenario, the mandate will be 
more intrusive. 
Why? Perhaps the mandate leaves less liberty in some rough 
quantitative sense. Imagine two polities: Mandatia and Prohibita. The 
legislature of each polity has enacted exactly one law. In Mandatia, 
everybody must φ. In Prohibita, no one may φ. If we imagine that φ-
ing is a somewhat time-consuming activity, then the people of 
Prohibita are freer than the people of Mandatia. In Prohibita, it is 
true, their liberty is constrained by the law that bans φ-ing, but so 
long as they do not φ, the people of Prohibita may do pretty much 
whatever they like. By contrast, the people of Mandatia are 
effectively forbidden from doing anything other than φ-ing during the 
time it takes to φ. Also, if φ-ing is expensive, then when Mandatia 
commands people to φ, it makes it impossible for them to use the 
funds necessary to φ for any other purpose. 
Nonetheless, the cost in time or money is not the main reason 
mandates might be considered more intrusive than prohibitions, 
ceteris paribus. Some mandates are especially objectionable even 
though one can comply with them quickly and at low cost. Laws that 
coerce speech comprise an important such category. One can comply 
with an obligation to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or to carry the 
message “Live Free or Die” on one’s license plate49 without much 
commitment of time or money. And yet the Supreme Court cases 
invalidating such mandates50 tap into a core libertarian intuition. The 
key Pledge case was decided during the Second World War, but it 
was not simply the timing that made Justice Robert Jackson’s 
invocation of totalitarianism51 appropriate. As the Court later 
explained in the less freighted license plate case, the state may not 
co-opt its citizens to its own ends; it may not “force[] an 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating criminal prohibition on covering 
New Hampshire state motto on license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge for children in public schools). 
 50. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 51. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (“Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson 
of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the 
Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, 
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”). 
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individual . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to 
an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”52 
That instrumentalization distinguishes mandates from prohibitions. 
The Barnette and Wooley Courts implied that the government, in 
seeking to use its citizens for the government’s ends, had—as Justice 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts would later complain in the ACA 
case53—changed the relationship between the individual and 
government. Mandates make citizens tools of the government rather 
than vice versa. They thus contravene a prohibition that Immanuel 
Kant and his followers have deemed essential to morality.54 
The Kantian prohibition on using our fellow human beings as 
means to our own ends may find expression in other legal 
distinctions between activity and inactivity. Consider, for example, 
the common law’s traditional (and largely still extant) rejection of 
any duty to rescue strangers. Private morality may oblige us to come 
to the aid of our fellow citizens, at least when we can do so at 
relatively little risk to ourselves, but the law generally does not55—
even as it imposes all manner of negative duties.56 
Thus, the compelled speech cases and the common law’s rejection 
of a general duty to rescue render comprehensible the claim by 
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts that such mandates 
change the relation between the government and the individual. But 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces 
an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”). For 
an excellent analysis of just what was wrong with the laws in Barnette and Wooley, see LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1314–18 (2d ed. 1988). 
 53. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 6, at 31. 
 54. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36–37 (Mary Gregor 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785). 
 55. See Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (“As a rule, one has no duty to come to the 
aid of another.”); Rhodes v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (Ill. 1996) (“Our common law 
generally imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon one who did not cause the injury in the 
first instance.”); see also, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to 
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1459 (2008). 
 56. It may be tempting to see the constitutional distinction between positive and negative rights as 
carrying out the same principle. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 202 (1989) (finding no due process violation where government officials recorded, but failed to 
intervene to prevent, severe child abuse). However, that limitation on the doctrine of state action appears 
to implement a distinct policy of separation of powers: Allocation of resources and law enforcement are 
generally left to legislative judgment. See id. 
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these examples do not make the claim plausible—at least not as a 
general matter—because our law recognizes a variety of affirmative 
obligations that cannot be reconciled with a general Kantian right 
against being treated as a means. 
In the ACA litigation, the government put forward various 
examples of federal mandates.57 Chief Justice Roberts and the four 
dissenters argued that none of the examples demonstrated that the 
Commerce power extends to mandates,58 but even if they were right 
on that point, such examples do undercut any claim that the 
Constitution generally forbids the government from instrumentalizing 
citizens. Jury duty, selective service, vaccination requirements, and 
of course, the obligation to pay taxes, all treat citizens (or in the last 
case, their money) as a means to some collective end. They rest on 
the proposition that people, or their labor, belong to us all, rather than 
to them alone. And all of these obligations are constitutionally 
valid.59 
Even the right against compelled speech—which Justice Jackson 
extolled in anti-totalitarian terms—is at most the complement of the 
right against prohibitions on speech. Indeed, in the commercial 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Reply Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 15–16, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426, at *16 (citing cases 
involving federal statutes on child support, sex-offender registration and racial discrimination); 
Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12 n.7, Florida 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-
RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4876894 (giving examples of jury service, census compliance, and acquiring 
armaments for the militia); Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Florida v. 
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 
5184233 (giving example of requiring commercial land owners to provide accessibility for people with 
disabilities). 
 58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 n.3 (2012) (“The examples of other 
congressional mandates . . . are not to the contrary. Each of those mandates—to report for jury duty, to 
register for the draft, to purchase firearms in anticipation of militia service, to exchange gold currency 
for paper currency, and to file a tax return—are based on constitutional provisions other than the 
Commerce Clause.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 2587 (“As expansive as our cases construing the 
scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe 
the power as reaching ‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting them.”). 
 59. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (mandating jury trials for criminal prosecutions); Arver v. 
United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (upholding the Selective Service Act); Brushaber v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (upholding federal income tax); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) 
(“[The 13th Amendment] was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals 
owe to the state, such as service[] . . . on the jury.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 
(1905) (upholding state law that allowed boards of health to mandate vaccinations). 
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context, the case law permits the government to compel speech in 
circumstances in which it could not forbid speech.60 Thus, 
notwithstanding the Kantian resistance any of us might feel towards 
instrumentalization, there does not appear to be any general 
constitutional principle that treats mandates as more intrusive on 
individual liberty than prohibitions. 
But if there is no such general principle, there is nonetheless one 
area of case law that does distinguish between mandates and 
prohibitions: the doctrine governing the right of bodily integrity. We 
see this distinction most clearly in cases involving death and dying. 
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the 
Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law that forbade the disconnection 
of a feeding tube or other medical intervention from a comatose 
patient, absent clear and convincing evidence that disconnection 
complied with the wishes the patient had expressed when 
competent.61 Although the case thus rejected a right-to-die claim, in 
doing so the lead opinion assumed arguendo that a competent adult 
has a constitutional right to refuse even life-saving medical treatment, 
including food and water.62 Justice O’Connor, who cast a fifth and 
crucial vote for the majority opinion, stated in a concurrence that she 
thought such a right in a competent person was established, not 
merely assumed.63 
And with good reason: the common law treated nonconsensual 
medical treatment as battery64 (absent an emergency in which 
consent could be presumed).65 Of course, modern doctrine does not 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that compelled 
disclosures for commercial speech are subject to a less intrusive form of scrutiny than flat prohibitions). 
 61. 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990). 
 62. Id. at 279. 
 63. Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 64. See id. at 269 (majority opinion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965) (“[A] 
surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who has refused to submit to it is not relieved from 
liability by the fact that he . . . believes that the operation is necessary to save the patient’s life. Indeed, 
the fact that . . . the patient would have died had the operation not been performed and that the operation 
has effected a complete cure is not enough to relieve the physician from liability.”). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979) (“Conduct that injures another does not make 
the actor liable to the other, even though the other has not consented to it if (a) an emergency makes it 
necessary or apparently necessary, in order to prevent harm to the other, to act before there is 
opportunity to obtain consent from the other or one empowered to consent for him, and (b) the actor has 
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constitutionalize all or even most of tort law, but it does appear to 
draw a line around the body. The Supreme Court has cited cases like 
Winston v. Lee66—involving nonconsensual surgery to obtain 
evidence—and Rochin v. California67—involving nonconsensual 
pumping of a suspect’s stomach for the same purpose—as 
cornerstones of the constitutional right to bodily integrity.68 The 
government may not compel citizens to do with their bodies as the 
government chooses—at least absent a very strong justification. 
But while mandates involving the body abridge the constitutional 
right to bodily integrity, prohibitions generally do not. Compare the 
Court’s assumed constitutional right to avoid medical treatment with 
the Court’s rejection of a right against prohibitions on particular 
medical interventions. Even while no doubt aware of the 
constitutional overtones, the Court rejected any statutory right to take 
the experimental drug Laetrile69 or to use medical marijuana.70 Also, 
in marked contrast with the right against compelled life-saving 
treatment assumed in Cruzan, the Court in Washington v. 
Glucksberg71 unanimously rejected a right to resist prohibitions on 
physician-assisted suicide. The majority opinion relied extensively on 
the distinction between a patient who refuses a medical 
intervention—that is, one who refuses to submit to a mandate to 
accept medical treatment—and a patient who wishes to violate the 
prohibition on acting to commit suicide.72 We can thus understand 
the distinction between the assumed right to let nature take its course 
and the non-right to hasten death as implementing a libertarian 
                                                                                                                 
no reason to believe that the other, if he had the opportunity to consent, would decline.”); see, e.g., 
Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 461 (N.J. 1983) (“Absent an emergency, patients have the right to 
determine . . . whether surgery is to be performed on them . . . .”). 
 66. 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985). 
 67. 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). 
 68. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). 
 69. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). 
 70. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 71. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 72. Id. at 725 (“The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as 
personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed 
similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.”). 
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principle holding that, at least with respect to bodily integrity, 
mandates are worse than prohibitions. 
Was the Court in Glucksberg warranted in treating the 
act/omission distinction as a proxy for the strength of the liberty 
claim?73 If so, it might be for the Kantian reasons I referred to above. 
All four of the dissenters in Cruzan argued that the Court gave 
insufficient procedural protection for the right to refuse medical 
treatment, arguing that the state had elevated its conception of the 
value of Nancy Cruzan’s life above her own.74 The state, in this view, 
instrumentalized Cruzan in violation of the categorical imperative, 
disregarding her own ends in favor of the ends that the state chose. 
To be sure, five Justices upheld the procedural scheme at issue in 
Cruzan,75 but in doing so they did not reject the core Kantian insight 
the dissenters propounded: the majority’s assumption that a 
competent person would have the right to refuse medical treatment 
even if death results is itself best understood as a product of the 
Kantian principle. 
The centrality of the activity/inactivity distinction to cases 
involving the right to bodily integrity explains the rhetorical power of 
two claims that were made about the ACA: that it authorized “death 
panels” and that upholding the Act would mean that a law mandating 
broccoli purchases would likewise be valid. The original “death 
panels” charge took aim at a provision76 in a House version of the 
then-pending legislation that would have authorized Medicare 
                                                                                                                 
 73. I co-authored an amicus brief on the losing side of Glucksberg, arguing, inter alia, that both 
physician-assisted suicide and the right to refuse medical treatment assumed in Cruzan are acts rather 
than omissions. Brief Amicus Curiae of State Legislation in Support of Respondents, Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709339. But the Court rejected that framing of the question. 
 74. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“The only state interest asserted here is a general interest in the preservation of life. But the State has no 
legitimate general interest in someone’s life, completely abstracted from the interest of the person living 
that life, that could outweigh the person’s choice to avoid medical treatment.”); id. at 344–45 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“Missouri asserts that its policy is related to a state interest in the protection of 
life. . . . Missouri insists, without regard to Nancy Cruzan’s own interests, upon equating her life with 
the biological persistence of her bodily functions.”). 
 75. Id. at 280. 
 76. America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 1233 (2009). 
However, H.R. 3200 was never enacted, and the ACA, as enacted and signed, contained no such 
provision. 
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reimbursement for end-of-life planning discussions between doctors 
and patients.77 Although nothing in the bill would have required 
patients to forgo medical treatment to which they were otherwise 
entitled or even to schedule appointments to make end-of-life plans, 
some conservative politicians and pundits nevertheless asserted that 
Congress and the Obama Administration were opening the door to 
rationing of care.78 The charge persisted even after the Medicare 
provision was dropped. Former Alaska Governor and 2008 
Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin, who had 
spearheaded the initial death panels charge, shifted gears in 2012, 
arguing that a different provision of the ACA—the one creating the 
Independent Payment Advisory Board—would act as the “death 
panel” that would ration care.79 Neither the original death panel 
charge nor its revised version ever had much grounding in reality,80 
but it had substantial emotional (and thus political) force because it 
tapped into a version of the Kantian worry. 
A government that rations health care—or even one that asks its 
citizens to think about the costs and benefits of end-of-life care—
tacitly asserts that life under some conditions has more worth than 
life under other conditions. The fear that the government does not 
simply defer to people’s prior judgments about the value of their 
lives is the same fear that the Cruzan dissenters raised.81 No matter 
how far-fetched in light of the actual content of the ACA, the fear of 
death panels may have been the same fear that drove the Court’s 
concern about instrumentalization in the bodily integrity cases in 
general and the right-to-die cases in particular. Nonetheless, the fear 
of death panels was not a fear that government would mandate 
activity, and thus it did not translate directly into the constitutional 
argument that the government may not regulate inactivity. To make 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/health/policy/14panel.html. 
 78. Constance Uribe, Commentary, The Coming Obamacare Rationing Government to Determine 
Value of Individual Lives, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at B04, available at 2012 WLNR 23837814. 
 79. Jason Millman, Sarah Palin Revives ‘Death Panel’ Message, POLITICO (June 26, 2012, 12:52 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77838.html. 
 80. See Kessler, supra note 11. 
 81. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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that move, the ACA’s opponents needed a different example. 
Broccoli fit the bill perfectly. 
Under extant constitutional doctrine, a law forbidding the 
consumption of broccoli would be subject to rational basis scrutiny, 
in the same way that laws forbidding the consumption of marijuana 
are subject only to rational basis scrutiny82—even though such 
prohibitions clearly implicate bodily integrity: they regulate what 
people may put in their bodies. Nonetheless, the mandate/prohibition 
distinction is crucial here. A law that required the ingestion of 
broccoli would infringe the substantive due process right to bodily 
integrity. The right to bodily integrity is chiefly a right to keep the 
government from forcing us to use our bodies in ways that we do not 
want to use them, rather than a right to do particular things with our 
bodies. Accordingly, a successful substantive due process challenge 
could very likely be mounted against a law compelling the 
consumption of broccoli. 
The hypothetical broccoli mandate was nonetheless inapt, 
however, because the ACA did not in fact infringe bodily integrity. A 
mandate to consume broccoli is analogous to a mandate to accept 
medical treatment: both infringe bodily integrity. But the ACA 
contains no mandate to submit to medical treatment. It only mandates 
the payment of money for (insurance to cover) medical treatment, 
which persons subject to the mandate remain free to refuse. Thus, as 
others have pointed out,83 a tighter analogy would have been a 
mandate to purchase broccoli. However, the ACA’s opponents likely 
wanted to avoid that analogy because it pushes strongly in favor of 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Ariz. 1977) (in banc) (“[T]here is a substantial body 
of expert and sincere opinion on both sides of the question. That being the case, we cannot say that the 
legislature had no rational or reasonable basis for proscribing the use of marijuana.”); Ill. NORML, Inc. 
v. Scott, 383 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying rational basis scrutiny and upholding law 
prohibiting private possession and use of marijuana); John C. Williams, Annotation, Constitutionality of 
State Legislation Imposing Criminal Penalties for Personal Possession or Use of Marijuana, 96 
A.L.R.3d 225, § 5(a) (1979) (surveying cases where state laws prohibiting possession or use were 
challenged). 
 83. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Op-Ed., The Broccoli Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/health-insurance-and-the-broccoli-test.html; Daniel 
Shaviro, The Supreme Court’s Healthcare Decision, WESTVIEW NEWS (Aug. 2012), 
http://westviewnews.org/2012/08/the-supreme-courts-healthcare-decision/. 
21
Dorf: Commerce, Death Panels, and Broccoli: Or Why the Activity/Inactiv
Published by Reading Room, 2013
918 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:4 
 
upholding the ACA, at least under the taxing power. After all, 
government routinely uses its taxing power to take money from 
citizens to fund purchases of food and other items that many of those 
citizens will never use.84 
CONCLUSION 
Apt or not, the broccoli analogy had emotional resonance with the 
Court’s conservatives in the ACA case because it called to mind a 
real constitutional concern—the worry that mandates could violate 
the substantive due process right to bodily integrity. That is more 
than a little bit ironic, given that the Court’s two staunchest 
conservatives—Justices Scalia and Thomas—have expressed doubt 
about the legitimacy of all substantive due process rights.85 
The irony goes deeper still, for in construing the enumerated 
powers to protect bodily integrity, the Court’s conservative wing 
relied on a right that finds very strong expression in the abortion 
jurisprudence86 that Justices Scalia and Thomas hold in special 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Agricultural subsidies are a leading example. Each year, the federal government uses taxpayer 
money to deliver $3.6 billion in subsidies that contribute to the production of grains fed to farmed 
animals. R. DENNIS OLSON, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, BELOW-COST FEED CROPS: AN 
INDIRECT SUBSIDY FOR INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FACTORIES 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.nffc.net/Learn/Reports/BelowCost6_06.pdf. As a vegan, I will eat none of the resulting 
products, but that fact does not entitle me to complain about the use of my pro rata share of the tax 
money for their purchase. 
 85. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If I thought that 
‘substantive due process’ were a constitutional right rather than an oxymoron, I would think it [was] 
violated by bait-and-switch taxation.”); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: 
The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, Lecture at 
Princeton University (Mar. 8 & 9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (1994–1995), 
available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/scalia97.pdf. For Justice Thomas’s view, 
see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–59 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I 
agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in 
the Second Amendment ‘fully applicable to the States.’ . . . But I cannot agree that it is enforceable 
against the States through a clause that speaks only to ‘process.’ Instead, the right to keep and bear arms 
is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). 
 86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“Roe, however, may be seen 
not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental 
power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection. If so, our cases since Roe accord with Roe’s 
view that a State’s interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of 
individual liberty claims.”). 
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disregard.87 Indeed, one can understand the objection to abortion 
prohibitions as fundamentally an objection to mandated activity. 
Abortion prohibitions formally forbid an act—abortion. But in 
substance they mandate an act—the use of a woman’s body to gestate 
a human life. If it is an intolerable infringement on liberty for the 
government to require anyone to ingest a single piece of broccoli, 
surely it is no less an infringement for the government to mandate 
that a woman give over her uterus to another being for nine months.88 
Thus, following the libertarian logic of the broccoli example to its 
natural conclusion, it is not surprising that the lawyers who advanced 
it in the hope of swaying five conservative Justices were content to 
disguise their liberty claim as a federalism claim. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 87. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“I write separately to reiterate my view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the 
Constitution.”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“That is, quite simply, the issue in these cases: not whether the 
power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a ‘liberty’ in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a 
liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty 
protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.”). 
 88. In saying that forced pregnancy is at least as burdensome on liberty as forced broccoli 
consumption, I mean to be making an utterly uncontroversial claim. One could grant the point but still 
think that abortion restrictions are justified in light of the government’s interest in fetal life. 
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